Public Responses to Anti-Semitism, 1933-1938 (Part A)
Source: David Bankier, Chapter 4 in: The Germans and the Final Solution , Public Opinion under Nazism, Oxford 1992, pp.67-88.
The initial months of Hitler's rule, and especially the week that followed the victory at the polls on 5 March, were marked by a wave of violence: arrests, maltreatment, kidnappings of people singled out for political reasons, assassinations of politicians and of those suspected of Marxist tendencies were daily affairs. The assaults on Jews were part of the ruthless eradication of the regime's opponents, a direct continuation of the antisemitic attacks, which preceded Hitler's rise to power, and an outgrowth of the euphoria that came after the seizure of power. Prominent examples of this situation were the large-scale outrages that members of the Nazi Party and its' affiliated organisations provoked: harassment, murder, vandalising of synagogues, desecration of Jewish graveyards, and destruction of property. During this period a large number of Jews were removed or suspended from all positions of prominence, subjected to arrest and stripped of their jobs at various public institutions. Jewish lawyers, doctors and teachers were dismissed throughout the Reich. Many had to flee for their lives, and others were incarcerated in prisons and camps. About the middle of March the physical attacks diminished in intensity, chiefly due to Hitler's appeal to his followers to adhere to blind discipline'. However, the unrest did not cease: there was a growing demand for measures against German Jews because they had allegedly instigated the reports of outrages, which had appeared in the foreign press.
The antisemitic atmosphere reached a climax with the nation wide anti-Jewish boycott staged by the Nazi Party on 1 April 1933, which also signalled the beginning of a new phase. Although the party apparatus formally planned, organised and carried it out, the boycott was de facto a state act and, as such, its impact on the Jews of Germany went far beyond the material damage involved. The boycott itself was officially stopped after one day, but from this point on antisemitic policy also took the form of state legislation.
The very first law passed by the new regime, the Law for the Restoration of the Professional Civil Service (7 April 1933), established race as a condition of employment and led to the removal of thousands of officials. Overriding the Constitution, it removed non-Aryans' from the civil service with the allegation that the Weimar Republic had filled the bureaucracy with incompetent functionaries, although in reality the Nazis wished to purge it of Jews and politically unreliable officials. This law was a milestone in Nazi antisemitic legislation because it furnished a new and important definition of a non-Aryan': i.e. anyone who had a non-Aryan' parent or grandparent. Besides, given that Jews in cultural, artistic and media occupations were being fired, academics discharged and teachers forced to relinquish their jobs, the law merely regulated existing practice by granting retroactive legality. The antisemitic legislation also prohibited Jewish conscription into the army when, at the end of February 1934, the law of 7 April 1933 was made applicable to the armed forces. This was not entirely new: already in December 1933 the army, on its own initiative, had proposed to observe the Aryan clause when dealing with appointments of officer cadets. Further measures included the dismissal of Jews from state, municipal and public services; a prohibition against employing Jewish judges and magistrates; harsh restrictions on Jews studying at schools and universities and the adoption of a law to annul the citizenship of Jews who immigrated to Germany after the First World War. Jewish rights were henceforth restricted by the ordinances and directives issued by the local and provincial authorities, as well as by professional organisations, which implemented the principles of the new law.
How did the German public react to this reality? It is impossible to determine from the reports what the population felt about the antisemtic drive. Few surveys exist on 1933, and from the crumbs of evidence it appears that the Jewish question was of marginal concern. If the reports provide scanty evidence on public reactions, there is little difficulty in finding other sources: diplomatic dispatches, eyewitness accounts and recollections allow tentative conclusions. From the impressions of a variety of observers representing a wide range of viewpoints, it looks as though the public identification with Nazi antisemtic policy was not clear-cut. Although in general the public recognised the necessity for some solution to the Jewish problem, large sectors found the form of persecution abhorrent. The impression these accounts give is that the boycott failed to achieve its objective and that there were misgivings about the brutal methods employed. These sources further suggest that a good many disapproved of the barbarity, which they feared would have disastrous economic consequences at a time when the country could ill afford them. Not only did sizeable parts of the population severely condemn the persecution, but even Nazi sympathisers did not fully endorse it. Sometimes there were animated discussions in front of Jewish shops and fighting broke out between the public and party men. Even generals wearing medals came to stores owned by Jews in Berlin to demonstrate their disapproval of the Nazi policy. The educated bourgeoisie seized the occasion of the rioting to take a stand and vent expressions of censure and protest. This sector in particular did not subscribe to the boycott, showing indignation and disgust that Germany should resort to such medieval methods 1 .
Aside from the criticism of violence, the campaigns conducted against the Bible caused heavy resentment in the church-going population. Yet the churches scarcely voiced these reservations officially, although they were still relatively independent. The Churchmen who levelled public criticism, such as Cardinal Michael Faulhaber in his sermons in December 1933, were exceptional. None the less, foreign observers rightly perceived that, while all these acts indicated opposition to the Nazis and their methods, they did not necessarily imply feelings in favour of the Jews 2 . In the short run most of those who felt embarrassed learned to turn a blind eye and retreat into non-political privacy. It was much easier to conform than to swim against the stream.
Where dismissals of Jews are concerned, the picture changes. In contrast to the criticism aroused by boycotts and violence, there seems to have been little public objection to the sacking of Jews, for a number of reasons. First, there was almost no disruption of bureaucratic activities, because the purge was limited to avoid any disastrous consequences. In Prussia it affected only 12.5ΓÇô15.5 per cent of the administration, in other states even less: between 4.5 and 5 per cent 3 . Second, all purges are a source of upward mobility: the extensive dismissals opened jobs for the unemployed and allowed young people to advance their careers. The expulsion of Jews and leftists from the universities and public service opened up posts and created opportunities for promotion, thus contributing to complacency and conformism in the academic and intellectual public. Third, and far more important, the absence of negative reactions in the existing sources ΓÇô mainly recollections ΓÇô seems to suggest that the removal of Jews from influential positions was consonant with the wishes of the great majority of the public. Just how far these wishes permeated German society is shown by the fact that even anti-Nazis subscribed to the measure. Following the removal of Jewish civil servants Thomas Mann wrote in his diary, It is no great misfortune after all that...the Jewish presence in the judiciary has been ended' 4 , and later on he added, I could to some extent go along with the rebellion against the Jewish element.' 5
Further evidence of such attitamong people who opposed the regime is prby a repowhich cites the outlook of a Catholic teacher from southern Germany who definitely disliked the Third Reich. The reporter says, however, that The Jews are for her another world. It is true that she finds barbarian their persecution and economic extermination. But she would think reasonable the introduction of a numerus clausus and certain limitations on candidacy for the civil service.' 6
Similarly, the application of the Aryan principle in the army elicited no public reaction, for it also left the military structure unharmed and only seventy officers were affected. We should not attach any importance to the few voices of protest, which were heard from army circles. They objected to the army's subordination to a party's ideology, not to the Aryan principle itself 7 .
For subsequent years, the broader documentary base allows more precise analysis. As shown earlier, the most striking development from 1934 on was the sobering of the spirit of national renewal' and the growing apathy towards indoctrination. If in this context we measure the results of the propaganda by its success in moulding attitudes and integrating the uncommitted public in the antisemitic drive, we can safely conclude that in most cases it failed. Whereas antisemitism played an integrative role for the party and its followers, it did not have the same function in spurring the general population to action. Abundant evidence of this appears in the responses to the renewed antisemitic wave in the autumn of 1934.
Reporting on public attitudes, the Gestapo station at Potsdam commented in September of that year, Undoubtedly the Jewish question is not the main problem of the German public... Utterances on the Jewish peril are diminished and those engaged in enlightening the population are to a certain extent depicted as fools.' 8 Reports from different regions show that this state of affairs was fairly widespread: the public was not galvanised by antisemitic propaganda, and Nazi observers realised that there was a gulf between the ideal of a society mobilised to fight the Jews and the reality that they encountered. Even if those who launched raids on the Jews cannot always be identified from the reports, it can certainly be assumed from endless testimonies that these were mostly members of Nazi organisations. Hence antisemitic terror ought to be attributed mainly to the Hitler Youth, the SA and other party foundations; the bulk of the public remained passive on the sidelines. Many were amused, but many were also deeply troubled by what they witnessed.
These attitudes were not confined to periods of relative calm, but featured prominently in the summer months of 1935, when the antisemitic thrust reached unprecedented heights and swept the Reich. Even during these turbulent months the propaganda scarcely motivated the public to respond positively to Nazi agitation. The harangues did not crack the wall of indifference: most of the population did not join in. One of many examples of this is to be found in the report of the Kiel Gestapo for July 1935: It is noteworthy that, whenever there are actions against the Jews, these emanate chiefly from members of the party and its affiliated organisations, whereas the majority of the population shows little participation in the Jewish question.' 9 Furthermore, if this report, from an area in the Protestant north noted for its vast support for the Nazis, shows that antisemitic campaigns did not bear fruit, then the response in other regions was even less favourable. In surveys of the public mood in Catholic regions, such as the Rhineland, with more liberal traditions, we find flat rejection of the incitement. Large sections of the population were repelled by the Stuermer methods and refused to comply with demands to take action against the Jews.
We should also bear in mind that certain elements exploited antisemitic incitement in order to settle personal accounts, especially by damaging Jewish business competitors. In a number of reports we find the public suspicious that the true motives behind the boycott were not ideological but a matter of personal interest. If this was the case, there was no point in taking part in the antisemitic campaign and fighting other people's wars. The fact that the reports' authors themselves mention the harmful role of the Nazi Craft and Commerce Organisation (NS-HAGO) on the antisemitic front is significant as an indicator of the Gestapo's sensitivity on the matter. When the NS-HAGO set the boycott in motion, the district governor in Wuerzburg noted that the general opinion about this organisation was that it was only out for itself and did not care at all about the wider population 10 . These claims seem to have been fairly common, for they crop up in many surveys, such as those from Koenigsberg, Dortmund and Harburg-Wilhelmsburg 11 . The last-mentioned station significantly observes that local people saw no ideological motives behind the antisemitic campaign, because the NS-HAGO was heading the boycott. Everybody regarded the campaign as an attempt to destroy business competition and not as an expression of racialist policy.
Gestapo stations repeatedly said that the amount of verbal, or even physical, violence engendered could not serve as an indicator of the success of propaganda in convincing people of the need for antisemitism. This was precisely the point made by the Kassel station with regard to the campaign of incitement in that area: It is easier to invite attacks on the Jews, than to persuade the public of antisemitism.' 12 The station repeated its assessment in September, concluding that incitement against Jews in meetings and rallies did not contribute to the desired goals. It did bring about rioting, but was of little help in winning over the apathetic public to the antisemitic cause 13 .
The fact that most people took little part in the antisemitic movement has a simple explanation. It is easier to arouse hooligans and the young to attack some concrete target than to win general adherence to an idea. Agitation against the Jews struck a chord first and foremost in the Hitler Youth and the SA, whereas the ordinary Germans remained passive onlookers. This point can be elaborated by exploring a number of representative cases.
The concentration on the Jewish question in the late winter months of 1935 was part of a nation wide propaganda campaign to activate the lower middle classes and restore their faith in Nazism. In September 1934, the Koblenz Gestapo had reported that retailers were still waiting for the fulfilment of promises made by the Nazis before they came to power. The traders demanded the immediate liquidation of the agencies, consumer co-operatives, department stores and other companies owned by Jews. The commentator also expressed his personal opinion that the lack of real policy in this field was depressing the morale of the lower middle class, generating negative attitudes towards the state and the party 14 . From the Aachen Gestapo report for March 1935 we gain much information on the methods employed in connection with the new antisemitic drive to lift the spirits of small shopkeepers. The local party organ, the Westdeutscher Beobachter , brought out a special supplement devoted entirely to the Jewish question; and antisemitic propaganda, which multiplied throughout the country, foreshadowed physical attacks on Jews and their property. The walls of Jewish homes and shops were smeared with faeces and red paint; Stuermer stickers were plastered on the walls; shots were fired into Jewish houses and so forth 15 . This hostile climate set the stage for the Cologne-Aachen Gauleiter , Grohe, who boasted that this drive had revived the morale of the lower middle class 16 .
As for the population in general, however, did this campaign win it over and bring it into line with Nazi policy? To answer this question let us look at the region in Grohe's charge, for there, fully supported by a fanatical Nazi, the antisemitic drive was whipped up to an exceptional degree.
It is particularly striking thateven the surveys from Grohe's jurisdiction to limeffects ofpropagandon the behaviour of the general public. A report for March from Cologne indicates that workers failed to respond to the call for a boycott and continued shopping in department stores. Workers' wives', the commentators noted, said they couldn't care less whether the store was owned by a Jew or a German'. 17 Further proof of the failure of indoctrination to penetrate the public consciousness is furnished by the report for April. The Gestapo agent concluded unequivocally that the public in general understood very little about antisemitic propaganda and the boycott 18 .
The same gap between the avalanche of propaganda and the public response to it emerges from surveys of the Trier area. Summing up the antisemitic activities during April and May 1935, the Nazi agent proudly declared the party's achievements: notices were posted demanding a boycott of Jewish shops, windows were smashed and Jews were beaten up in the streets. He also mentioned the role played by children in this campaign. Yet he admitted that the majority of the population refused to comply with the demands of the party and continued shopping at Jewish stores. In one shop during the Easter sales there were so many customers that the Jewish shopkeeper was forced to close several times, in order to serve all of them properly 19 .
It should not be assumed that such behaviour was typical only of working-class opposition to the Nazis. Businessmen also did not react favourably to the party's appeals, though not out of ethical considerations. They complained that antisemtic activities damaged Germany's economic interests, showing that they merely feared the anti-Jewish boycott would hamper their ties with traders abroad 20 . What worried those involved in the tourist industry is illustrated by the Bielefeld Gestapo, which commented, For ten years the Dutch consul spent his holidays in Bad Oeynhausen, and now he will not return because of the scenes of hooliganism he witnessed.' 21 Added to these worries was concern for Germany's image, especially if such actions were observed by foreigners and could be used for anti-German propaganda abroad. For similar reasons brutal attacks alienated the educated bourgeoisie in Potsdam and Koenigsberg 22 . For a good many inhabitants of Cologne the question was merely a practical one: who would pay the bill for the damage caused by rioting? They were troubled by the cost of antisemtic outrages. In the course of a fortnight rioters smashed plate glass to the value of RM 20,000, a loss which would be met by German insurance companies and so would, in the final account, have to be paid by people such as themselves 23 .
It seems, therefore, that at this stage of Hitler's rule people did not co-operate willingly with the party organisations in enforcing antisemitic boycotts. On the contrary, they mostly continued shopping in stores owned by Jews despite the heavy pressures exerted by the SA to frighten off customers. We should not conclude, however, that refraining from participation in the antisemitic campaign originated in, or was identical with, principled opposition to persecution of Jews. We rarely find rejection of Nazi antisemitism on ethical principles, or indignation based on humanitarian values. Moreover, expressions of solidarity with the persecuted Jews are quite exceptional. The real motives behind the refusal to accept the party's calls are usually stated in the reports themselves: very rarely did they exceed utilitarianism or self-interest.
A comprehensive examination of the violent disturbances which erupted in the summer of 1935 contradicts two widespread images: the one of a terrorised German population whose silence enabled the Nazis to pursue anti-Semitic persecution; the other of a brainwashed society mobilised to endorse unconditionally any sort of Nazi policy. In stark contrast to these popular images, it is clear that the public was neither silent nor brainwashed. The prosecution of anti-Jewish policy depended, to a large extent, on the public's reaction. There is conclusive evidence that on the whole the population consented to attacks on Jews as long as these neither damaged non-Jews nor harmed the interests of the country, particularly its reputation abroad. As a passing comment in a report from northern Germany puts it, far from being passive, the population demonstrated opposition when it feared that its own interests were being endangered 24 .
Occasionally the Gestapo illustrates its surveys with concrete instances of public, non-conformist behaviour in the face of anti-Semitic policy. A report from Magdeburg, for example, records an unusual form of opposition to the boycott: buyers stood demonstratively in front of the camera placed by the party at the entrance to a Jewish shop and bade defiance to the Nazis 25 . It is impossible to know what lay behind the courageous stand in this place. There seems little doubt, however that in most cases the fate of the Jews was not important enough to elicit criticism. The Jewish theme was instrumental for some discontented sectors in expressing their dissatisfaction with the Nazi system. The Gestapo stations in Muenster and Dortmund correctly captured the reality when they stated that the public went to Jewish shops not as a demonstration of solidarity with the persecuted, but as a way of expressing disillusionment with the regime 26 . Furthermore, people could support the Nazis and yet disapprove of measures against the Jews. A striking example of rejecting Jewish persecution from an anti-Semitic stand is provided by a report from Harburg-Wilhelmsburg. The local Gestapo admitted that the public did not just fail to understand the attacks on the Jews, but actually condemned them. The reason for this attitude was given by the commentator himself: people felt that maltreatment of Jews was counterproductive, since it turned them into martyrs; the party thus achieved the opposite of its original objective 27 .
Criticism of the political wisdom of persecuting Jews reappears in a later report from the same station. This time what upset the public was not the tragic image Jews presented to their neighbours, but anxiety over Germany's reputation: in the face of the rioting many went on saying that it ought to be stopped because it harmed Germany's image abroad. The Gestapo noted further that, even when most people firmly adhered to a tough policy on the Jewish issue, they nevertheless objected to its implementation through violence. The population, explained the reporter, argued that such excesses only added fuel to the atrocity propaganda spread against the Third Reich 28 . The Gestapo in Kiel likewise noted the negative reaction of people who worried that the Jewish question had cost too much from the point of view of foreign policy 29 . This case is worth noting because intertwined in the utilitarian argument over Germany's image we find a rare humanitarian motive: the belief that Jews should be left in peace because they also are human beings.
All signs point to the conclusion that, even in a Catholic region with considerable anti-Nazi feelings, it was not the fact that Jews were being victimised that upset the public but the brutal and vulgar nature of the persecution. The Cologne Gestapo throws light on this matter: The following factors must be considered for the prevailing bad mood: (1) the unclear situation in foreign policy; (2) the struggle against the Church; and (3) the form of the anti-Jewish struggle.' 30 The report from Magdeburg for July bears witness to the fact that it was not anti-Semitism as such, but its extent and degree, that aroused public criticism. There was a point at which the bourgeoisie felt that the violence, and the anti-Semitic campaign that had produced it, might have gone too far 31 . The Koenigsberg Gestapo summed up public reaction in almost the same terms 32 .
References:
1. J. Tomaszewski, The situation of the Jews in Germany in spring 1933 as reflected in reports of the Polish Republic Legation and Consulate General in Berlin', Biuletyn Zidwskiego Instytutu Historycznego , 139-40 (1986), pp. 131-42; H. J. Robinsohn, Ein Versuch sich zu be', Tradition , 3 (1958), pp. 197-206; R. Weltsch, First of April 1933', World Jewry , 1 (1958), p. 11; Uhlig, Warenhaeuser , p. 84; Genschel, Die Ausdraengung , p. 52; report of the Italian Embassy in Berlin, 6 Apr. 1933, CDJC, CDL-15; diaries of Mally Dienemann and Max Riener, LBI, entries for 3 April 1933. Riener noted that in Berlin people just moved away from the SA men and went into Jewish shops. There was no sympathy for the Jews but people complained that a government could not sanction such political manoeuvres.
2. H. Rumbold to Foreign Office, 5 and 13 April 1933, PRO, FO 408/62.
3. J. Noakes and G. Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945 (Exeter University Press, Exeter, 1984), vol. II, p. 225.
4. F. Stern, Dreams and Delusions. The drama of German history (Knopf, New York, 1987), p. 180.
5. Ibid., p. 181.
6. Sopade, Feb. 1937, A 22.
7. Noakes and Pridham, Nazism 1919-1945 , vol. II, pp.642-3.
8. Gestapo Potsdam, report Sep. 1934, GStA, REP/90 P.
9. Gestapo Kiel, report July 1935, ibid. Various party reports indicate the apathy with which calls for participation in the antisemitic drive were received by the populace: see for example Kreispropagandaleiter, Kreisleitung Eichstaedt, report Mar. 1935, StA N, NSDAP Nr. 8. See also F. Wiesemann, Judenverfolgung und nichtjuedische Bevoelkerung', in Broszat et al., Bayern in der NS Zeit , vol. I, pp. 441, 449.
10.RP Wuerzburg, report May 1934, YVA, JM/2858. On the old middle class and its attitude to antisemitic policy see C. D. Krohn and D. Stegmann, Kleingewerbe und NS in einer agrarisch-mittelstaendischen Region. Das Beispiel Lueneburg 1930-1933', Archiv fuer Sozialgeschichte , 17 (1977), pp. 1-40; A. von Saldern, Mittelstand im Dritten Reich' . HandwerkerΓÇôEinzelhaendlerΓÇôBauern (Campus, Frankfurt a.M., 1979), pp. 154-82.
11.1269.Gestapo HarburgΓÇôWilhelmsburg, report July 1935, GStA, REP/90 P; Gestapo Koenigsberg, report Apr. 1935, ibid.; Gestapo Dortmund, report Aug. 1935, ibid.; RP Oldenburg, report July 1935, BA, R 18/1568.
12.Gestapo Kassel, report Aug. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P.
13.Gestapo Kassel, report Sep. 1935, BA, R 58/529.
14.RP Koblenz, report Sep. 1934, BA, 18/1564.
15.Gestapo Aachen, report Mar. 1935, BA, R 58/100; Vollmer, Volksopposition , p. 181.
16.Gauleiter Grohe, report Apr. 1935, BA, NS 22/vorl. 583. On the agitative value of antisemitism see Gestapo Wilhelmshaven, report Aug. 1935, NAW, T 175 R 313 F 2813141.
17.Gestapo Aachen, report July 1935, BA, R 58/662; Vollmer, Volksopposition, p. 255.
18.Gestapo Koeln, report Mar. 1935, GStA, REP/90 P.
